The Sample Complexity of Up-to-$\varepsilon$ Multi-Dimensional Revenue
  Maximization by Gonczarowski, Yannai A. & Weinberg, S. Matthew
The Sample Complexity of
Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization
Yannai A. Gonczarowski∗ S. Matthew Weinberg†
December 22, 2018
Abstract
We consider the sample complexity of revenue maximization for multiple bidders in
unrestricted multi-dimensional settings. Specifically, we study the standard model of
n additive bidders whose values for m heterogeneous items are drawn independently.
For any such instance and any ε > 0, we show that it is possible to learn an ε-Bayesian
Incentive Compatible auction whose expected revenue is within ε of the optimal ε-BIC
auction from only polynomially many samples.
Our approach is based on ideas that hold quite generally, and completely sidestep
the difficulty of characterizing optimal (or near-optimal) auctions for these settings.
Therefore, our results easily extend to general multi-dimensional settings, including
valuations that aren’t necessarily even subadditive, and arbitrary allocation constraints.
For the cases of a single bidder and many goods, or a single parameter (good) and
many bidders, our analysis yields exact incentive compatibility (and for the latter
also computational efficiency). Although the single-parameter case is already well-
understood, our corollary for this case extends slightly the state-of-the-art.
1 Introduction
A fundamental question at the heart of the literature on mechanism design is that of revenue
maximization by a single seller who is offering for sale any number of goods to any number of
(potential) bidders. In the classic economic literature, this problem is studied in a Bayesian
setting: the seller has prior knowledge of (often, independent) distributions from which the
valuation of each bidder for each good is drawn, and wishes to devise a truthful mechanism
that maximizes her revenue in expectation over these prior distributions. Over the past few
years, numerous works at the interface of economics and computation are now studying a
more demanding model: that of mechanism design from samples. In this model, rather than
possessing complete knowledge of the distributions from which the bidders’ values for the
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various items are drawn, the seller more realistically only has access to samples from these
distributions (e.g., past data). The goal in this setting is to learn with high probability an
auction with good revenue guarantees given polynomially many (in the parameters of the
problem) samples.
Revenue maximization from samples is somewhat ubiquitously seen as a “next step” be-
yond Bayesian revenue maximization. That is, existing works so far in this context take set-
tings for which simple auctions in the related Bayesian problem are already well-understood
and prove that these simple auctions can be learned efficiently via samples (up to an ε loss,
which will always be lost when optimizing from samples). For example: in single-parameter
settings, seminal work of Myerson (1981) completely characterizes a simple and optimal auc-
tion in the Bayesian setting, and works such as Cole and Roughgarden (2014); Morgenstern
and Roughgarden (2015); Devanur et al. (2016); Hartline and Taggart (2016); Roughgarden
and Schrijvers (2016); Gonczarowski and Nisan (2017) prove that these simple mechanisms
or variants thereof can be learned with polynomially many samples. Similarly, in multi-
parameter settings with independent items, works of Chawla et al. (2007, 2010, 2015); Hart
and Nisan (2012); Babaioff et al. (2014); Rubinstein and Weinberg (2015); Yao (2015); Cai
et al. (2016); Chawla and Miller (2016); Cai and Zhao (2017) prove that simple mechanisms
achieve constant-factor approximations in rich multi-dimensional settings, and works of Mor-
genstern and Roughgarden (2016); Balcan et al. (2016, 2018); Cai and Daskalakis (2017);
Syrgkanis (2017) prove that simple mechanisms with these guarantees can be learned with
polynomially many samples. These analyses rely on a delicate understanding of the structure
and/or inherent dimensionality of auctions that give such revenue guarantees to show how
to learn such an auction without overfitting the samples.
It is therefore unsurprising that the problem of learning an up-to-ε revenue-maximizing
multi-item auction from samples has not been previously studied, since the structure/
dimensionality of optimal (precisely or up-to-ε) multi-item auctions is not understood even
when there is only one bidder, and even with independent items. Such auctions are known
to be extremely complex, suffering from properties such as randomization (Thanassoulis,
2004), uncountable menu complexity (Daskalakis et al., 2013), and non-monotonicity (Hart
and Reny, 2015). Such domains provably lack the natural starting point of all previous works:
a structured/low-dimensional mechanism in the Bayesian setting to learn via samples.
In this paper we show that despite these challenges, up-to-ε optimal multi-item auctions
can be learned from polynomially many samples from the underlying bidder-item distribu-
tions. More formally, in a setting with n bidders and m items where the value of each
bidder i for each item j is drawn independently from a distribution Vi,j supported on [0, H]
for some H that is known to the seller, we show that polynomially many samples suffice
for learning, with probability at least 1 − δ, an m-item almost-truthful auction that max-
imizes the expected revenue among all possible m-item almost-truthful auctions up to an
additive ε. Below, BIC refers to Bayesian Incentive Compatible: an auction for which it is
in every bidders’ interest to bid truthfully, given that all other bidders do so as well.
Theorem 1 (Main Result — informal version of Theorem 4). For n bidders with independent
values for m items supported on [0, H], for every ε, δ > 0 and for every η ≤ poly(n,m,H, ε),
the sample complexity of learning, w.p. 1− δ, an η-BIC auction that maximizes revenue
(among all η-BIC auctions) up to an additive ε is poly(n,m,H, 1/ε, 1/η, log 1/δ).
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The above theorem is informal mostly because we have not specified exactly how bid-
ders value bundles of items. Essentially the bidders may have arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily
additive, not even necessarily subadditive) valuations subject to some Lipschitz condition
(i.e., changing the value of bidder i for item j by ε only changes the bidder’s value for any
outcome by at most Lε for some absolute constant L).1 We defer a formal definition to
Section 2, but only note here that commonly studied classes of valuations such as additive,
unit-demand, or “additive subject to constraints” with independent items (as well as sev-
eral natural subadditive and superadditive valuation classes) all satisfy our definition with
Lipschitz constant 1.
The main challenge in proving our result for m > 1 items is noted above: the struc-
ture of (up-to-ε) optimal mechanisms for such settings is not understood, even for additive
valuations. In particular, there is no known low-dimensional class of mechanisms that is
guaranteed to contain an (up-to-ε) optimal mechanism for any product distribution, thus
barring the use of many learning-theoretic arguments. Our result relies on a succinct struc-
tured argument, allowing to reduce revenue maximization from samples to related problems
of revenue maximization from given discrete distributions.
As the corresponding Bayesian question remains open (i.e., whether one can find, given
the distributions explicitly, an up-to-ε optimal mechanism in poly-time), our result is of
course information-theoretic: it shows that polynomially many samples suffice for a com-
putationally unbounded seller, but provides no computationally efficient learning algorithm.
Concretely, the algorithm that we give uses as a black box an oracle that can perform (opti-
mal or almost-optimal) multi-item Bayesian revenue maximization given (the full description
of) finite prior distributions.2
1.1 Brief Overview of Techniques
Most prior works (for single- as well as multi-dimensional settings) take the following ap-
proach: first, define a class Cε of auctions as a function of ε. Second, prove that, for all
possible distributions D, the class Cε contains an up-to-ε optimal mechanism for D. Finally,
prove that the best-in-class (up to ε) for Cε can be learned with polynomially many samples.
In prior works, ingenuity is required for both steps: Cε is explicitly defined, proved to con-
tain up-to-ε optimal auctions, and proved to have some low-dimensional structure allowing
efficient learnability.
Our approach indeed follows this rough outline, with two notable simplifying exceptions.
First is our approach to defining Cε. Here, we first define Cε,S be the space of all auctions
that are optimal for an empirical distribution over S-many poly(ε)-rounded samples (that
is, optimal for any discrete product distribution where each marginal is: a) only supported
on multiples of poly(ε) and b) uniform over a multiset of size S). While, unlike popular
existing approaches, the set Cε,S grows with the number of samples S, we show that the
rate of its growth is moderate enough so that there exists a “sweet-spot” number of samples
1Our results in fact hold even more generally: to arbitrary outcomes that do not even correspond to
bundles of items. See Section 2 for the full details.
2Note however that if computationally efficient algorithms were to be developed for up-to-ε optimal
mechanisms given an explicit prior, then our approach would immediately become computationally efficient
as well.
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S = poly(1/ε) such that on the one hand Cε,S contains an auction that is up-to-ε optimal for
the “true distribution” D and on the other hand, the best-in-class from Cε,S can be learned
from S samples. So in the language of prior work, one could say that we set Cε = Cε,S for
this S = poly(1/ε).
To show that Cε does in fact contain, for all distributions D, an auction that is up-to-ε
optimal for D, we simply take enough samples to guarantee uniform convergence (of the
revenue) over Cε and additionally the optimal auction for D. It’s far from obvious why this
should suffice, as the optimal auction for D is not an element of Cε, nor even of the same
format.3 Still existing tools (namely, the ε-BIC-to-BIC reduction of Daskalakis and Weinberg
(2012); Rubinstein and Weinberg (2015)), when applied correctly, suffice to complete the
argument. This part of our proof is conceptually much simpler than prior works (despite
making use of a big technical hammer), as this approach holds quite generally and is robust
due to not requiring the analysis of any specific class of mechanisms.
Second, our argument that the best-in-class can be in fact learned (up to ε) with S =
poly(ε) samples is simply a counting argument, and does not require any notions of a learning
dimension. This is indeed in the spirit of some recent single-dimensional results, however in
those results the counting argument is highly dependent on the structure of auctions in Cε.
As discussed above, such dependence is damning for multi-dimensional settings where such
structure provably doesn’t exist. Again, the proof does require some hammers (notably,
arguments originally developed for reduced forms via samples in Cai et al. (2012), and a
concentration inequality of Babichenko et al. (2017); Devanur et al. (2016)), but they are
applied in a fairly transparent manner.
The above approach should help explain how we are able to extend far beyond prior works,
which relied on a detailed analysis of specific structured mechanisms: The key tools we use
are applicable quite generally, whereas the specific mechanisms analyzed in prior work are
only known to maintain guarantees only in restricted settings. For example, Theorem 1 al-
ready constitutes the first up-to-ε optimal-mechanism learning result for any multi-parameter
setting even if it held only for additive valuations (and one bidder). But the approach is so
general that extending it to arbitrary Lipschitz valuations with independent items is simply
a matter of updating notation.
1.2 Applications and Extensions
Specialized to a single-bidder setting, our construction in fact yields exact truthfulness (more
on that in Section 6), showing that an ε-optimal mechanism can be found for a single bidder
with independent item values (with Lipschitz valuations) using only polynomially many
samples. This should be contrasted with a result of Dughmi et al. (2014), which shows that
achieving this is not possible for correlated distributions, even for a bidder with additive
valuations.
3That is, the optimal auction for D is a mapping from the the support of D to outcomes, whereas the
elements of Cε are mappings from a finite space to outcomes. Furthermore, notions of Bayesian incentive
compatibility for D do not imply nor are implied by these notions for the various discrete distributions
defining Cε.
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Corollary 1 (Single Bidder — informal version of Theorem 5). For one bidder with inde-
pendent values for m items supported on [0, H], for every ε, δ > 0, the sample complexity of
learning, w.p. 1−δ, an IC auction that maximizes revenue (among all IC auctions) up to an
additive ε is poly(m,H, 1/ε, log 1/δ).
Specialized to single-dimensional settings, our analysis once again yields a strengthened
result, both in giving exact Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC)4, and in pro-
viding a computationally efficient algorithm (due to known efficient solutions (Elkind, 2007;
Myerson, 1981) to single-parameter revenue maximization from given discrete distributions):
Corollary 2 (Single-Parameter — informal version of Theorem 6). For n single-parameter
bidders with independent values in [0, H], for every ε, δ > 0, the sample complexity of
efficiently learning, w.p. 1−δ, a DSIC auction that maximizes revenue (among all DSIC
auctions) up to an additive ε is poly(n,H, 1/ε, log 1/δ).
Corollary 2 nicely complements the existing literature on single-parameter sample com-
plexity in the following ways. First, our algorithm/analysis immediately follows as a special
case of Theorem 1 (without referencing structural results about optimal single-parameter
auctions), so it is in some sense more principled. Second, our analysis holds even for ar-
bitrary constraints on the allocations (putting it in the same class as the state-of-the-art5
single-parameter results (Hartline and Taggart, 2016; Gonczarowski and Nisan, 2017), and
even slightly beyond6).
Finally, portions of our approach are specific to Bayesian Incentive Compatible auctions
(versus Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible auctions), but portions are not. We’re
therefore able to use the same techniques to conclude similar, albeit qualitatively weaker,
results for ε-DSIC auctions in Theorem 11. See Appendix A for further details.
1.3 Related Work and Brief Discussion
Two active lines of work are directly related to the present paper. First are papers that
study rich multi-dimensional settings, and aim to show that mechanisms with good approxi-
mation guarantees can be learned with few samples, such as Morgenstern and Roughgarden
(2016); Balcan et al. (2016, 2018); Cai and Daskalakis (2017); Syrgkanis (2017). The main
approach in each of these works is to show that specific classes of structured mechanisms
(e.g., classes that are known to allow for constant-factor revenue maximization) are inher-
ently low-dimensional with respect to some notion of dimensionality. Our results are stronger
than these in some regards and weaker in others. More specifically, our results are stronger
4A mechanism is DSIC if it is a dominant strategy for each bidder to bid truthfully. For a single good,
Myerson (1981) shows that the maximal revenue attainable by a BIC mechanism and by a DSIC mechanism
is the same.
5Here and throughout the paper when we refer to “state-of-the-art” for single-parameter settings, we are
specifically referring to allocation constraints that can be accommodated.
6Note that for the single-parameter setting, our algorithm in fact coincides with that of Devanur et al.
(2016). However our analysis, unlike theirs, extends to arbitrary allocation constraints. Our approach also
transparently handles mild extensions of constraints beyond those considered in Hartline and Taggart (2016);
Gonczarowski and Nisan (2017). Gonczarowski and Nisan (2017) explicitly state that their techniques cannot
handle such extensions and leave this question (which we successfully resolve) open.
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in the sense that with comparably many samples, our mechanisms guarantee an up-to-ε ap-
proximation to the optimal mechanism instead of a constant-factor. Our results are weaker
in the sense that our learning algorithms are information-theoretic (do not run in poly-time),
and our mechanisms are not “as simple.” As discussed earlier, both weaknesses are necessary
in order to possibly surpass the constant-factor barrier (at least, barring the resolution of
major open questions, such as a computationally efficient up-to-ε approximation even when
all distributions are explicitly known. Again, note that should this question be resolved
affirmatively, our results would immediately become computationally efficient as well).
Most related to our work, at least in terms of techniques, is the rich line of works on
single-dimensional settings (Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015; Cole and Roughgarden, 2014; Huang
et al., 2015; Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015; Devanur et al., 2016; Hartline and Taggart,
2016; Roughgarden and Schrijvers, 2016; Gonczarowski and Nisan, 2017). These works show
that up-to-ε optimal mechanisms can be learned in richer and richer settings. In comparison
to these works, our single-dimensional results slightly extend the state-of-the-art (Hartline
and Taggart, 2016; Gonczarowski and Nisan, 2017) as a corollary of a more general theorem
that applies to multi-dimensional settings. Even restricted to single-dimensional settings,
our proof is perhaps more transparent.
We conclude with a brief discussion and an open problem. Corollaries 1 and 2 are both
deduced from Theorem 1 by use of an argument as to why the resulting ε-BIC auction is in
fact BIC, or by using an ε-BIC to BIC reduction that loses negligible revenue. Given that
we have explicitly referenced the existence of a quite general ε-BIC-to-BIC reduction, the
reader may be wondering why this reduction does not in fact allow our general results to be
exactly BIC as well.
The main barrier is the following: in order to actually run the ε-BIC-to-BIC reduction
as part of our auction for n > 1 bidders, one must take samples exponential in the number
of items from each bidders’ value distribution. This means that even though we can learn
an ε-BIC mechanism with few samples, plugging it through the reduction to remove the ε
would cost us exponentially many samples in addition. Note that our current use of these
theorems is non-constructive: we only use them to claim that the revenues achievable by
the optimal BIC and ε-BIC mechanisms are not far off. This conclusion does not actually
require running the reduction, but rather simply observing that it could be run (more details
in Section 5).
When bidder valuations are drawn from a product distribution, it seems conceivable (es-
pecially given our results), that sample complexity polynomial in the number of items should
suffice. Indeed, if each bidders’ values are drawn i.i.d., this is known due to exploitations
of symmetry (Daskalakis and Weinberg, 2012). But subexponential sample complexity is
not known to suffice for any other restricted class of distributions, despite remarkable re-
cent progress in developing connections to combinatorial Bernoulli factories (Dughmi et al.,
2017). We state below what we consider to be the main open problem left by our work
in the context of this paper, but readers familiar with black-box reductions in Bayesian
mechanism design will immediately recognize a corresponding open problem for the original
welfare-maximization setting studied in Hartline et al. (2011); Bei and Huang (2011) that is
equally enticing.
Open Problem 1. Given an ε-BIC auction for some product distribution, even in an ad-
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ditive multi-item setting, is it possible to transform it into a (precisely) BIC auction with
negligible (poly(ε) ·poly(n,m,H)) revenue loss using polynomially many samples from this
product distribution?
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we formally present the
model and setting. In Section 3, we formally state our results, which are informally stated
above as Theorem 1 and Corollaries 1 and 2. In Section 4, we overview the main ideas
behind the proof of Theorem 1, a proof that we give in full detail in Section 5. In Section 6,
we derive Corollaries 1 and 2. We present some extensions in Section 7. In Appendix A,
we state and prove a result analogous to Theorem 1 for DSIC auctions, using similar proof
techniques. Parts of certain proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
2 Model and Preliminaries
The Decision Maker (Seller), Bidders, and Outcomes. A single decision maker has
the power to choose a social outcome, such as who gets which good that is for sale, or such as
which pastime activities are offered in which of the weekends of the upcoming year. There are
n bidders who have stakes in this outcome. (The decision maker will be able to charge the bid-
ders and will wish to maximize her revenue.) The possible set of allowed outcomes is denoted
by X and can be completely arbitrary. A central example is that of an m-parameter auction:
the decision maker is a seller who has m items for sale, and the set of outcomes/allocations
is X ⊆ [0, 1]n·m, where an allocation ~x = (xi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] ∈ X specifies for each bidder i and
good j the amount of good j that bidder i wins. The traditional multi-item setting is the
special case with X = Xmulti-item ,
{
(xi,j)i,j ∈ {0, 1}n·m | ∀j :
∑n
i=1 xi,j ≤ 1
}
, while outcomes
with fractional coordinates occur for example in the canonical model of position auctions,
where smaller coordinates denote smaller click-through rates.
Values. Bidder i ∈ [n] has a valuation function vi(·) over the set of possible outcomes X.
This function is parametrized by m values vi,1, . . . , vi,m (we will not explicitly write vi,~vi(·),
but refer to the parameters implicitly for ease of notation. Moreover, as vi(·) is completely
determined by vi,1, . . . , vi,m, we will sometimes simply refer to ~vi as bidder i’s value, and
to vi,j as bidder i’s value for parameter j) and drawn from a given distribution such that:
• (Independent Parameters) The vi,js are independent random variables, drawn from
distributions Vi,j which are all supported in [0, H].
• (Lipschitz) There exists an absolute constant L, such that if v′i,1, . . . , v′i,m is ob-
tained from vi,1, . . . , vi,m by modifying one of the vi,js by at most an additive ε, then
|vi(x)− v′i(x)| ≤ Lε for all x ∈ X.
For example, in the multi-item setting described above, vi(x) =
∑m
j=1 xi,j · vi,j (and L = 1).7
7This case is actually Lipschitz in a stronger sense: if v′i,1, . . . , v
′
i,m is obtained from vi,1, . . . , vi,m by
modifying one of the vi,js by at most an additive ε, then |vi(~x)− v′i(~x)| ≤ |~x|1 · Lε for L = 1. We note that
using this stronger property (as well as other properties of the multi-item setting such as monotonicity),
our analysis (mutatis mutandis) can be used to quantitatively improve the polynomial dependency of our
sample complexity on the parameters of the problems, however we do not follow this direction in this paper.
In general, in this paper we always choose generality of results over tighter polynomials.
7
An additive-up-to-k-items setting may also be easily captured using this setting (again with
L = 1), and so can even settings with complementarities, such as a setting in which good 2j
is worth vi,j to bidder i iff bidder i also gets good 2j + 1 (and is otherwise worthless to
bidder i). Since X can be completely arbitrary (in particular does not have to be a subset
of [0, 1]n·m), we can most generally think of the vi,js as parameters that capture the “relevant
attributes” of each bidder, such as affinity to action films, affinity to winter sports, willingness
to spend a lot of time in a pastime activity, etc. The only requirement is that these attributes
are a “natural” parametrization in the sense that the utility of the bidder from any given
outcome x ∈ X smoothly depends on (i.e., is Lipschitz in) each of them,8 and that they are
independently drawn.
We note that both properties above (independent items and Lipschitz) together imply
that the valuation of each bidder for each outcome is bounded in [0,mLH].
Payments, Priced Outcomes, and Mechanisms. A payment specification p = (pi)i∈[n]
specifies for each bidder i to be charged pi. A priced outcome is a pair (x, p) of allocation
and payment specification. The utility of bidder i with value vi(·) from priced outcome (x, p)
is ui
(
vi, (x, p)
)
= vi(x)− pi. An auction/mechanism is a function that maps each valuation
profile (vi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] to a distribution over priced outcomes. The seller’s expected revenue
from a mechanism µ is Ev∼×i,j Vi,j
[∑
i∈[n] pi(v)
]
, where p(v) is the payment specification
chosen by the mechanism for the valuation profile v.
Truthfulness. An auction µ is individually rational (IR) if the expected utility of a truth-
ful bidder is nonnegative at any valuation profile, i.e.: E
[
uk
(
vk, µ(v)
)] ≥ 0 for every k ∈
[n] and v ∈ [0, H]n·m, where the expectation is over the randomness of the auction. For
ε > 0, an auction µ is ε-dominant-strategy incentive compatible (ε-DSIC) if truthful bid-
ding maximizes a bidder’s expected utility at any valuation profile up to an additive ε, i.e.:
E
[
uk
(
vk, µ(v)
)] ≥ E [uk(vk, µ(v′k, v−k))]−ε for every k ∈ [n], v ∈ [0, H]n·m, and v′k ∈ [0, H]m,
where the expectation is once again over the randomness of the auction. An auction is DSIC
if it is 0-DSIC. An auction µ is ε-Bayesian incentive compatible (ε-BIC) if truthful bidding
maximizes a bidder’s utility in expectation over all valuations of the other bidders, up to
an additive ε, i.e.: Ev−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Vi,j
[
uk
(
vk, µ(vk, v−k)
)] ≥ Ev−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Vi,j
[
uk
(
vk, µ(v
′
k, v−k)
)] − ε
for every k ∈ [n] and vk, v′k ∈ [0, H]m, where the expectation is both over the valuations of
the bidders other than k and over the randomness of the auction. An auction is BIC if it is
0-BIC.
Additional Notation. We will use the following additional notation in our analysis, where
ε > 0:
• For v ∈ [0, H], we denote by bvcε the value of v, rounded down to the nearest integer
multiple of ε.
• We use [0, H]ε =
{bvcε | v ∈ [0, H]} to denote the set of integer multiples of ε in [0, H].
8This rules out such “tricks” as using bit-interleaving to condense the m parameters into a single param-
eter.
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• For every i, j, we denote by bVi,jcε the distribution of bvi,jcε for vi,j ∼ Vi,j.
Existing Tools. In our analysis, we will make use of the following two theorems, which
we state below in a way that is adapted to the notation of our paper. The first shows the
optimal revenue over all ε-BIC auctions and the optimal revenue over all BIC auctions are
close (while this is stated in Rubinstein and Weinberg (2015) with respect to multi-parameter
settings with allocations in {0, 1}n·m, the same proof holds verbatim for arbitrary outcome
sets X):
Theorem 2 (Rubinstein and Weinberg, 2015;9 see also Daskalakis and Weinberg, 2012).
Let D be any joint distribution over arbitrary valuations, where the valuations of different
bidders are independent. The maximum revenue attainable by any IR and ε-BIC auction
for D is at most 2n√mLHε greater than the maximum revenue attainable by any IR and
BIC auction for that distribution.
The second is a Chernoff-style concentration inequality for product distributions:
Theorem 3 (Babichenko et al., 2017; see also Devanur et al., 2016). Let D1, . . . , D` be
discrete distributions. Let S ∈ N. For every i, draw S independent samples from Di, and let
D
(S)
i be the uniform distribution over these samples. For every ε > 0 and f :×`i=1 suppDi →
[0, H], we have that Pr
(∣∣E×`i=1D(S)i [f ]− E×`i=1Di [f ]∣∣ > ε)≤ 4Hε exp(− ε2S8H2 ).
3 Main Results
In this section, we formally state our main results, which were informally presented as
Theorem 1 and Corollaries 1 and 2 in the introduction. We start with our main result.
Theorem 4 (Main Result). For every ε, δ > 0 and for every η ≤ poly(n,m,L,H, ε),
the sample complexity of learning an up-to-ε optimal IR and η-BIC auction is
poly(n,m,L,H, 1/ε, 1/η, log 1/δ). That is, there exists a deterministic algorithm10 that given
poly(n,m,L,H, 1/ε, 1/η, log 1/δ) samples from each Vi,j, with probability 1−δ outputs an IR
and η-BIC auction that attains from×i,j Vi,j expected revenue at most an additive ε smaller
than any IR and η-BIC auction.
The following corollary of our main result should be contrasted with a result of Dughmi
et al. (2014), which shows that finding an ε-optimal mechanism for a single additive bidder
with correlated item distributions requires exponentially many samples.
9If we denote by Rε the maximum expected revenue attainable by any IR and ε-BIC auction for the
bidders’ product distribution, and by R the maximum revenue attainable by any IR and BIC auction for
the same distribution, then the result of Rubinstein and Weinberg (2015) is that for any η > 0, it is the case
that R ≥ (1 − η) · (Rε − nεη ). Choosing η =
√
ε
mLH yields Theorem 2 as stated above, since Rε is trivially
bounded from above by the maximum possible sum of valuations, i.e., by nmLH.
10Recall that this result is information-theoretic and not computationally efficient (by necessity, without
resolving major open problems), so our decision maker (seller) is computationally unbounded, and we allow
the algorithm to make calls to any deterministic oracle that has no access to any Vi,j . In particular, we
assume access to an oracle that can solve the revenue maximization problem on any precisely given V ′i,j of
finite support.
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Theorem 5 (Single Bidder). When there is n = 1 bidder, for every ε, δ > 0, the sample
complexity of learning an up-to-ε optimal IR and IC11 auction is poly(n,m,L,H, 1/ε, log 1/δ).
That is, there exists a deterministic algorithm12 that given poly(n,m,L,H, 1/ε, log 1/δ) sam-
ples from each Vi,j, with probability 1−δ outputs an IR and IC auction that attains from×i,j Vi,j expected revenue at most an additive ε smaller than any IR and IC auction.
The following corollary of our main result unifies and even somewhat extends the state-
of-the-art results for single-parameter (m = 1) revenue maximization. To state it we restrict
ourselves to the setting where revenue maximization has been solved by Myerson (1981):
assume that X ⊆ [0, 1]n and that vi(x) = vi · xi.13
Theorem 6 (Single-Parameter). In an m = 1-parameter setting with X ⊆ [0, 1]n and
vi(x) = vi · xi, for every ε, δ > 0, the sample complexity of efficiently learning an up-to-ε
IR and DSIC auction is poly(n,m,L,H, 1/ε, log 1/δ). That is, there exists a deterministic al-
gorithm with running time poly(n,m,L,H, 1/ε, log 1/δ) that given poly(n,m,L,H, 1/ε, log 1/δ)
samples from each Vi,j, with probability 1−δ outputs an IR and DSIC auction that attains
from×i,j Vi,j expected revenue at most an additive ε smaller than any IR and BIC auction.
4 Main Result Proof Overview
In this section we roughly sketch our learning algorithm and present each of the main ideas
behind its analysis, by presenting a proof overview structured to present each of these ideas
separately. The proof overview is given in this section only for an additive multi-item setting,
and some elements of the proof are omitted or glossed over for readability. The full proof,
which contains all omitted details and applies to a general arbitrary Lipschitz setting, and
in which the main ideas that are surveyed in this section separately are quite intermingled,
is given in Section 5.14
Our learning algorithm is similar in nature to the one presented in Devanur et al. (2016)
for certain single-parameter environments, however the analysis that we will use to show
that it does not overfit the samples is completely different (even for single-parameter en-
vironments, where our analysis holds for arbitrary allocation constraints). Recall that our
result is (necessarily) information-theoretic and not computationally efficient. Therefore,
some steps in the algorithm perform operations that are not known to be performable in
poly-time (but can certainly be performed without access to any Vi,j). In particular, our
algorithm will solve an instance of a Bayesian revenue maximization problem for a precisely
given input of finite support (step 2).
11Recall that for a single bidder, the notions of BIC and DSIC coincide.
12See Footnote 10.
13This setting is slightly more general than the state-of-the-art single-parameter results, which assume
X ⊆ {0, 1}n and/or the special setting of position auctions (Hartline and Taggart, 2016; Gonczarowski
and Nisan, 2017). As noted in the introduction, Gonczarowski and Nisan (2017) explicitly state that their
techniques cannot accommodate arbitrary X ⊆ [0, 1]n and leave this question (which we successfully resolve)
open.
14The somewhat less involved proof for DSIC auctions that is sketched in this section as an intermediary
proof is given in Appendix A, both since we find that result interesting in its own right, and to allow
interested readers to familiarize themselves with that proof before diving into the more involved proof for
BIC auctions in Section 5.
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Algorithm. We start with S (to be determined later) independent samples from each Vi,j.
Our algorithm roughly proceeds as follows:
1. For each bidder i and good j, round all samples from Vi,j down to the nearest multiple
of ε. Denote the uniform distribution over these rounded samples by Wi,j.
2. Find an IR and O(ε)-IC (see below) multi-item auction that maximizes the revenue
from the product of the rounded empirical distributions Wi,j. Denote this auction by µ.
3. Return the auction µε, which on input ~v, rounds down all actual bids to the nearest
multiple of ε, b~vcε, and allocates and charges payments according to the output of
µ(b~vcε) when run on these rounded bids.
We start by showing that if in step 2 of our algorithm we take an IR and O(ε)-DSIC
auction that maximizes the revenue from the product of the rounded empirical distribu-
tions, then there exists S = poly(n,m,H, 1/ε, log 1/δ) such that the auction µε output by
our algorithm is O(ε)-DSIC and its revenue from×i,j Vi,j is, with probability at least 1−δ,
up-to-O(ε)-close to the maximum revenue attainable from×i,j Vi,j by any DSIC auction.
(The formal statement and full proof are given in Appendix A.) We note that the auction
output by the algorithm is indeed O(ε)-DSIC, since the output µ in step 2 is O(ε)-DSIC,
and the rounding of the actual bids as defined in step 3 only loses another mε.15
Uniform Convergence of the Revenue of all Possible Output Mechanisms. Note
that for every i, j, each rounded sample from step 1 of the algorithm is independently dis-
tributed according to bVi,jcε. The main challenge is in showing that the resulting auction
gives up-to-O(ε) optimal revenue not only on the rounded empirical distributions×i,jWi,j,
but also on the rounded true distributions×i,jbVi,jcε. That is, the main challenge is in
showing that no overfitting occurs, in the absence of any structural properties that we can
exploit for the mechanisms that are optimal (or up-to-O(ε) optimal) for×i,jWi,j.
This is the point where our approach makes a sharp departure from prior works. Prior
work deems this task to be hopeless, and proceeds by proving structural results on optimal
mechanisms for restricted domains. We circumvent this by instead simply counting the
number possible inputs we will ever query in step 2, and observing that the number of
mechanisms over which we have to obtain uniform convergence is at most this number. A
crucial observation is that while we do have to consider more and more mechanisms as the
number of samples S grows, the number of mechanisms that we have to consider grows
moderately enough so as to not eclipse our gains from increasing the number of samples
that we take. For this argument to hold, it is essential that our distributions are product
distributions.
Let V be the set of all product distributions×i,jW ′i,j where each W ′i,j is the uniform
distribution over some multiset of S values from [0, H]ε. Let M be the set of all mechanisms
returned by step 2 of the algorithm for some distribution×i,jW ′i,j ∈ V . At the heart of
15The astute reader will notice that mε /∈ O(ε). As all our bounds are polynomial in m, 1/ε anyway, this
is immaterial, and one example of a detail that we glossed over in this section in the interest of cleanliness,
as promised.
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our analysis, and of this part of our analysis in particular, is the observation that
|V| ≤ (S + )n·m·dH/εe. Crucially, this expression has S only in the base and not in
the exponent. Indeed, for every×i,jW ′i,j ∈ V , for every i, j, and for every integer multiple
of ε in [0, H] (there are dH/εe many such values), the probability of this value in W ′i,j can be
any of the S + 1 values 0, 1/S, . . . , 1. Therefore, |M | ≤ (S + 1)n·m·dH/εe.
We will choose S so that with probability at least 1−δ, it simultaneously holds for all
mechanisms µ ∈M that
|Rev×i,jWi,j(µ)− Rev×i,jbVi,jcε(µ)| ≤ ε. (1)
To this end, we will use a Chernoff-style concentration bound (Theorem 3) for product
distributions, which when applied to our setting shows that for each auction separately Equa-
tion (1) is violated with probability exponentially small in ε
2S
m2H2
. So, to have Equation (1)
hold with probability at most 1−δ for all auctions in M simultaneously, we choose S so that
the violation probability for each auction separately is at most δ/|M |, and use a union bound.
Since |M | ≤ (S + 1)n·m·dH/εe, we have that it is enough to take S such that ε2S
m2H2
is of order
of magnitude at least log |M |/δ = log (S+1)
n·m·dH/εe
δ
≈ log 1/δ + n ·m · H/ε logS, which is clearly
possible by taking a suitable S that is polynomial in n, m, H, 1/ε, and log 1/δ. So, taking a
number of sample of this magnitude gives that with probability at least 1−δ, Equation (1)
simultaneously holds for all mechanisms in M and so the mechanism output by step 2 of the
algorithm gets up-to-O(ε) the same revenue on the product of the rounded empirical distri-
butions×i,jWi,j as it does on the product of the rounded true distributions×i,jbVi,jcε. So,
the revenue that the mechanism µε output by (step 3 of) the algorithm attains from×i,j Vi,j
is identical to the revenue that the mechanism µ output by step 2 of the algorithm attains
from×i,jbVi,jcε, which is up-to-O(ε) the optimal revenue attainable from×i,jWi,j.
Revenue Close to Optimal. Our next task is to show that with high probability the
optimal revenue attainable from×i,jWi,j by any O(ε)-DSIC auction is up-to-O(ε) the same
as the optimal revenue attainable from×i,j Vi,j by any DSIC auction, which would imply
that the revenue that µε attains from×i,j Vi,j is close to optimal, as required. Let OPT
be the DSIC auction that maximizes the revenue (among such auctions) in expectation
over×i,j Vi,j. At the heart of this part of our analysis is the fact that while our
algorithm cannot hope to find OPT, we can nonetheless carefully reason about
it in our analysis, as it is nonetheless fixed and well-defined (in particular, it
does not depend on the drawn samples). Let OPTε be the mechanism defined over×i,jbVi,jcε as follows: for each bidder i and item j, let wi,j be the input bid of bidder i
for item j (a multiple of ε), and replace it by a bid vi,j independently drawn from the
distribution Vi,j conditioned upon being in the interval [wi,j, wi,j + ε); the auction OPTε
allocates and charges payments according to the output of OPT when run on these drawn
replacement bids. Obviously, the auction OPTε is an O(ε)-DSIC auction whose revenue from×i,jbVi,jcε is identical to that of the auction OPT from×i,j Vi,j, i.e., to the optimal revenue
from×i,j Vi,j, so it is enough to show that the revenue of the auction OPTε from×i,jbVi,jcε
and from×i,jWi,j is the same up-to-O(ε) with high probability, that is, that Equation (1)
also holds for the mechanism OPTε with high probability. To do so, we modify the definition
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of the set M to also include the (well-defined even prior to sampling, despite being unknown
to our algorithm) mechanism OPTε — since the order of magnitude of |M | does not change,
the order of magnitude of the number of samples required to guarantee that Equation (1)
holds for all auctions in M (including OPTε) does not change.
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility. We conclude our proof overview by adapting the
proof to the more delicate BIC notion of incentive compatibility, thus showing that if in
step 2 of our algorithm we take an O(ε)-BIC (rather than O(ε)-DSIC) and IR auction that
maximizes the revenue from the product of the rounded empirical distributions, then there
exists S = poly(n,m,H, 1/ε, log 1/δ) such that the auction µε output by our algorithm is,
with probability at least 1 − δ, an O(ε)-BIC auction whose revenue from×i,j Vi,j is up-
to-O(ε)-close to the maximum revenue attainable from×i,j Vi,j by any BIC auction (and
therefore, by Theorem 2, up-to-O(
√
ε)-close to the revenue attainable from this distribution
by any O(ε)-BIC auction)16. The challenge here is that (approximate) BIC is a distribution-
dependent property of a mechanism (as opposed to DSIC, which is a distribution-agnostic
incentive compatibility notion). Indeed, examining our analysis above with (ε-)DSIC re-
placed by (ε-)BIC, we note that the resulting analysis falls short of carrying through in two
points: it is unclear why OPTε is O(ε)-BIC not only with respect to×i,j Vi,j but also with
respect to×i,jWi,j, and it is unclear why any mechanism that can be output by step 2 of our
algorithm is O(ε)-BIC not only with respect to×i,jWi,j but only with respect to×i,j Vi,j.
At the heart of this part of our analysis is the observation that the set of all in-
terim expected utilities, of all bidders’ possible types, from all possible reported
types, in all mechanisms17 on the one hand is comprised of a small-enough num-
ber of random variables to still enable uniform convergence, and on the other
hand contains sufficient information to show that incentive constraints do not
deteriorate much. Concretely, we will choose S so that with probability at least 1 − δ,
simultaneously for all mechanisms in M (including OPTε) not only does Equation (1) hold,
but also the following holds for every bidder k ∈ [n] and values vk, v′k ∈ [0, H]mε :
|Ev−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Wi,j
[
uk
(
vk, µ(v
′
k, v−k)
)]− Ev−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
bVi,jcε
[
uk
(
vk, µ(v
′
k, v−k)
)] | ≤ ε. (2)
We note that for every mechanism µ, we require that Equation (2) hold for n · dH/εe2m
distinct combinations of of k ∈ [n] and vk, v′k ∈ [0, H]mε . Crucially, this number does not
depend on S. So, the number of instances of Equation (2) that we would like to hold
simultaneously with high probability is |M | ·n·dH/εe2m, and so we have |M | ·(1+n·dH/εe2m) ≤
(1 + n ·dH/εe2m) · (S + 1)n·m·dH/εe instances of either Equation (1) or Equation (2) that we
would like to hold simultaneously with high probability.18 As this number still has S only
in the base and not in the exponent, we can proceed as above to guarantee this with high
probability using only a polynomial number of samples.
16Theorem 2 in fact allows us to also reduce to a cleaner oracle, which finds an optimal BIC auction rather
than an optimal O(ε)-BIC auction, in Section 5.
17The set of all such interim expected utilities for a single mechanism is sometimes referred to as the
reduced form of the mechanism.
18A somewhat similar idea appeared in Cai et al. (2012), albeit without exploiting independence across
items.
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Function EmpiricalOptimize(H,X, ε, δ, (vsi,j)
s∈[S]
i∈[n],j∈[m]):
Input: For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], (vsi,j)s=1 is a sequence of
S = O˜
(
n2m2L2H2
ε2
· (log 1/δ + nmHε )) samples from Vi,j
Output: With probability 1−δ, an IR and (3mε)-BIC mechanism for×i,j Vi,j , defined
over [0, H]n·m with allocations in X, whose expected revenue from×i,j Vi,j is
up to an additive
(
(2+n)mε+ 2nm
√
7LHε
)
smaller than that of any IR and
(3mε)-BIC mechanism for×i,j Vi,j with allocations in X
for i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] do
for s ∈ [S] do
wsi,j ←− bvsi,jcε
end
Wi,j ←− the uniform distribution over (wsi,j)Ss=1
end
µ←− OptimizationOracle(H, ε, (Wi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m]) // See definition below
return The mechanism that for input (vi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] outputs µ
((bvi,jcε)i∈[n],j∈[m])
Function OptimizationOracle(H,X, ε, (Wi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m]):
Input: For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], Wi,j is a distribution over [0, H]ε
Output: An IR and BIC mechanism for×i,jWi,j , defined over [0, H]n·mε with
allocations in X, which maximizes the expected revenue from×i,jWi,j among
all IR and BIC mechanisms for×i,jWi,j with allocations in X
µ←− an IR and BIC mechanism for×i,jWi,j (defined over×i,j suppWi,j) with
allocations in X, which maximizes the expected revenue from×i,jWi,j among
all such mechanisms
return The mechanism obtained by extending µ to be defined over (vi,j)i,j ∈ [0, H]n·mε as
follows: for every k ∈ [n] s.t. vk,j /∈ suppWk,j for some j 6= [m], replace the
entire bid vector vk = (vk,j)j∈[m] of bidder k with a bid vector
v′k = (v
′
k,j)j∈[m] ∈ supp×jWk,j that maximizes
Ev′−k∼×i,j:i 6=kWi,j
[
uk
(
vk, µ(v
′
k, v
′
−k)
)]
Algorithm 1: Empirical Multi-Parameter Up-to-ε BIC Revenue Maximization.
5 Proof of Main Result
In this section, we give the full details of the proof of our main result, Theorem 4. The
proofs of supporting lemmas are relegated to Appendix B.
Proof of Theorem 4. We assume that for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], we have S (to be
determined later) independent samples (vsi,j)
S
s=1 from Vi,j. Algorithm 1 presents our learning
algorithm, which is similar in nature to the one presented in Devanur et al. (2016) for certain
single-parameter environments, however the analysis that we will use to show that it does not
overfit the samples is completely different (even for single-parameter environments, where
our analysis holds for arbitrary allocation constraints). We now analyze Algorithm 1. Note
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that for every i, j, s, we have that wsi,j ∼ bVi,jcε independently.
Let V be the set of all product distributions×i,jW ′i,j where each W ′i,j is the uniform
distribution over some multiset of S values from [0, H]ε. Let M be the set of all mechanisms
of the form OptimizationOracle(H,X, ε,×i,jW ′i,j) for all×i,jW ′i,j ∈ V . At the heart of our
analysis is the observation that |V| < (S + 1)n·m·dH/εe. (Crucially, this expression has S only
in the base and not in the exponent!) Indeed, for every×i,jW ′i,j ∈ V , for every i, j, and for
every integer multiples of ε in [0, H] (there are dH/εemany such values), the probability of this
value in W ′i,j can be any of the S+1 values 0, 1/S, . . . , 1. (The inequality on |V| is strict since,
for example, not all probabilities can be 0 simultaneously.) Therefore, |M | < (S+1)n·m·dH/εe.
Let OPT be the IR and (3mε)-BIC auction for×i,j Vi,j that maximizes the expected
revenue (among such auctions) from×i,j Vi,j (our learning algorithm cannot hope to find
OPT, but in our analysis we may carefully reason about it, as it is nonetheless well defined;
in particular, it does not depend on S). Let OPTε be the (randomized) mechanism defined
over×i,jbVi,jcε as follows: let w = (wi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] be an input valuation; for each i, j, in-
dependently draw vi,j ∼ Vi,j|[wi,j ,wi,j+ε); let (x, p) = OPT
(
(vi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m]
)
; the allocation of
OPTε(w) is x, and the payment of each bidder i is pi −mε.
Lemma 5.1. OPTε is an IR and (5mε)-BIC mechanism for×i,jbVi,jcε, whose expected
revenue from×i,jbVi,jcε is nmε smaller than the expected revenue of OPT from×i,j Vi,j.
We will choose S so that with probability at least 1−δ, both of the following simultaneously
hold for all mechanisms µ ∈M ∪ {OPTε}:
• |Rev×i,jWi,j(µ)− Rev×i,jbVi,jcε(µ)| ≤ mε, (3)
• For every agent k ∈ [n] and types vk, v′k ∈ [0, H]mε :
|Ev−k∼×i,j:i6=kWi,j
[
uk
(
vk, µ(v
′
k, v−k)
)]− Ev−k∼×i,j:i 6=kbVi,jcε [uk(µ(v′k, v−k))] | ≤ mε. (4)
We note that for every mechanism µ, we require that Equation (4) hold for n ·dH/εe2m
distinct combinations of of k ∈ [n] and vk, v′k ∈ [0, H]mε . Crucially, this number does not
depend on S.
By Theorem 3 (with ` , n · m, and note that any mechanism’s revenue is bounded
by nmLH), we have that for each mechanism µ ∈ M ∪ {OPTε} separately Equation (3)
holds with probability at least 1 − 4nmLHe− exp(−ε2S/(8n2m2L2H2))
ε
, and for each combination of
(µ, k, vk, v
′
k) separately Equation (4) holds with probability at least 1− 4LHe
− exp(−ε2S/(8L2H2))
ε
.
Choosing S so that each of these probabilities is at least 1 − δ
(|M |+1)·n·dH/εe2m , we obtain
that both Equation (3) holds simultaneously for all mechanisms µ ∈M ∪{OPTε} and Equa-
tion (4) holds simultaneously for all combinations (µ, k, vk, v
′
k) with probability at least 1−δ.
We now estimate S. Since |M ∪ {OPTε}| ≤ (S + 1)n·m·dH/εe, we have that it is enough to
take S such that
S ≥ 8n2m2L2H2
ε2
· (log 4nmLH
ε
+ log 1/δ + log n+ 2m logdH/εe+ nmdH/εe log(S + 1)).
Therefore,19 there exists an appropriate
19The requirement is of the form S ≥ a+ b logS, so the tight solution is of order a+ b log(a+ b).
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S = O
(
n2m2L2H2
ε2
· log nmLH
εδ
+ n
3m3L2H3
ε3
log
(
n2m2L2H2
ε2
· log nmLH
εδ
+ n
3m3L2H3
ε3
))
=
= O˜
(
n2m2L2H2
ε2
· (log 1/δ + nmH
ε
))
.
Let µ be the output of the call to OptimizationOracle in Algorithm 1, and let µε be
the final output of the algorithm (the output of EmpiricalOptimize).
Lemma 5.2. If Equation (4) holds for each combination of (µ, k, vk, v
′
k), then:
• OPTε is a (7mε)-BIC mechanism for×i,jWi,j.
• The expected revenue of µ from×i,jWi,j at most 2nm√7LHε smaller than the expected
revenue of OPTε from×i,jWi,j.
• µ is a (2mε)-BIC mechanism for×i,jbVi,jcε.
Lemma 5.3. µε is an IR mechanism whose expected revenue from×i,j Vi,j identical to the
expected revenue of µ from×i,jbVi,jcε. Furthermore, if µ is (2mε)-BIC for×i,jbVi,jcε, then
µε is (4mε)-BIC for×i,j Vi,j.
So, with probability at least 1−δ, we have both that µε is an IR and (4mε)-BIC mechanism
(by Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3) and that:
Rev×i,j Vi,j(µε) = (by Lemma 5.3)
= Rev×i,jbVi,jcε(µ) ≥ (by Equation (3) and since µ ∈M)
≥Rev×i,jWi,j(µ)−mε ≥ (by Lemma 5.2)
≥Rev×i,jWi,j(OPTε)− 2nm
√
7LHε−mε ≥ (by Equation (3) for OPTε)
≥Rev×i,jbVi,jcε(OPTε)− 2mε− 2nm
√
7LHε = (by Lemma 5.1)
= Rev×i,j Vi,j(OPT)− (2+n)mε− 2nm
√
7LHε.
6 From Approximate to Exact Incentive Compatibility
In this section, we derive sample complexity results for exact incentive compatibility for
the special cases of a single bidder (Theorem 5) or a single good / single-parameter setting
(Theorem 6). As mentioned in the introduction, whether this can also be done for more
general settings remains an open question.
6.1 One Bidder
In this section, we will prove Theorem 5. For a single bidder, the following theorem, which
to the best of our knowledge first implicitly appeared in Balcan et al. (2005), where it is
attributed to Nisan,20 provides an ε-IC to IC reduction with negligible revenue loss.
20 It appears there and in following papers (Chawla et al., 2007; Hart and Nisan, 2013; Dughmi et al.,
2014; Babaioff et al., 2017; Gonczarowski, 2018) as part of a two-step reduction sometimes called “nudge
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Theorem 7 (Nisan, circa 2005). Let µ be an IR and ε-IC21 mechanism for a single bidder.
Modifying each possible priced outcome by multiplying the payment in that priced outcome
by 1−√ε and letting the bidder choose the (modified) priced outcome that maximizes her utility
yields an IR and IC mechanism µ′ with expected revenue at least (1−√ε) · (Rev(µ)−√ε).
For completeness, we provide a proof of this theorem. The idea is that discounting more
expensive priced outcomes more heavily makes sure that incentives do not drive the bidder
toward a much cheaper priced outcome. More concretely, due to the auction being only ε-IC,
the utility of a bidder from choosing a cheaper priced outcome can be higher by at most ε.
Since for any priced outcome whose price is cheaper by more than a
√
ε compared to the
bidder’s original priced outcome, the given discount is smaller by more than
√
ε
2
= ε, this
smaller discount more than eliminates any potential utility gain due to choosing the cheaper
priced outcome, so such a cheaper priced outcome would not become the most-preferred one.
Proof. Fix a type v ∈ [0, H]m for the bidder. Let e be the priced outcome (a distribution
over priced outcomes, i.e., a random variable, if µ is randomized) according to µ when the
bidder has type v. It is enough to show that the bidder pays at least (1−√ε)(pe −
√
ε) in
expectation according to µ′ when he has type v. (We denote the expected price of, e.g., e
by pe.) Let f
′ be a possible priced outcome of µ′, and let f be the priced outcome of µ that
corresponds to it. We will show that if pf ′ < (1−
√
ε)(pe −
√
ε), then the bidder strictly
prefers the priced outcome e′ of µ′ that corresponds to e over f ′ (and so does not choose f ′
in µ′, completing the proof). Indeed, since in this case pf < pe −
√
ε, we have that
E [u(v, e′)] = E [u(v, e)]+
√
ε·pe ≥ E [u(v, f)]−ε+
√
ε·pe = E [u(v, f ′)]−
√
ε·pf−ε+
√
ε·pe =
= E [u(v, f ′)]− ε+√ε · (pe − pf ) > E [u(v, f ′)]− ε+
√
ε · √ε = E [u(v, f ′)] ,
as required.
Applying Theorem 7 to the auction output by Algorithm 1 yields Theorem 5.
6.2 Single-Parameter Settings
In this section, we will prove Theorem 6. The algorithm presented in Section 5 consti-
tutes a black-box reductions from ε-BIC revenue maximization from samples to BIC revenue
maximization from given distributions. As noted in the introduction, the latter are mostly
unsolved for more than one good. For a single good, however, the problem of DSIC/BIC rev-
enue maximization was completely resolved by the seminal work of Myerson (1981) (who, in
particular, showed that the optimal BIC mechanism is DSIC), and the computation complex-
ity of the solution for discrete distributions was shown by Elkind (2007) to be polynomial.
and round” (this is the “nudge” part), which reduces the menu size of a single-bidder auction with negligible
revenue loss. To the best of our knowledge, the first reference to this argument as a general ε-IC to IC
reduction rather than as part of a “nudge and round” operation (where it fixes IC issues resulting from
rounding) is in Daskalakis and Weinberg (2012), who also attribute it to Nisan following Chawla et al.
(2007), who in turn attribute it to Nisan following Balcan et al. (2005).
21Recall once again that for a single bidder, the notions of BIC and DSIC coincide.
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Definition (Myersonian Auction, Myerson, 1981). An n-bidder Myersonian auction (for
valuations in [0, H]) is a tuple (φi)i∈N , where for every i ∈ [n], φi : [0, H] → R is a
nondecreasing function called the ironed virtual valuation of bidder i. The chosen outcome
is x ∈ X that maximizes ∑i∈[n] xi · φi(vi), with ties broken in a consistent manner. The
payment is defined by the payment identity of Myerson (1981), which guarantees that the
auction is IR and DSIC.
Theorem 8 (Myerson, 1981). For every product distribution×ni=1Wi, there exists a (DSIC)
Myersonian auction (φi)
n
i=1 that attains maximum revenue from×ni=1Wi among all IR and
BIC auctions. Moreover, for every i ∈ [n], the ironed virtual valuation φi depends only
on Wi.
Theorem 9 (Elkind, 2007). Let S ∈ N. There exists an algorithm that runs in time poly(S),
such that given a discrete distribution W with support of size at most S, outputs a nondecreas-
ing function φ : suppW → R, such that for every product×ni=1Wi of discrete distributions
each having support of size at most S, the (DSIC) Myersonian auction (φi)i∈N (where φi is
the output of the algorithm given Wi) maximizes the expected revenue from×ni=1Wi among
all IR and BIC auctions.
Plugging22 Theorem 9 into Algorithm 1 brings us closer (by making the algorithm effi-
cient) to proving Theorem 6, however seems to still result in an ε-DSIC (rather than precisely
DSIC) auction. Indeed, in the notation of Section 5, while µ is DSIC, it seems that µε is
only O(mε)-DSIC. To complete the proof of Theorem 6, we note that the latter is in fact ex-
actly DSIC in this case. Indeed, its allocation rule is monotone, and it satisfies the payment
identity of Myerson (1981) for every bidder.
7 Extensions
7.1 On Computational Efficiency
As mentioned above, it is currently not known how to efficiently implement the optimization
oracle, outputting an up-to-O(ε)-optimal auction, as used in our algorithm. Nonetheless,
there has been quite some work on efficiently finding auctions with weaker revenue guaran-
tees with respect to optimal, such as guaranteeing some constant fraction of the optimal rev-
enue. As the structured argument of our analysis provides a black-box reduction from BIC-
revenue-maximization given a full distributions description to ε-BIC-revenue-maximization
from samples, we can plug in any such algorithm into our analysis (in lieu of the optimization
oracle) to obtain a learning algorithm with matching computational complexity and revenue
degradation:
Theorem 10 (“Meta Theorem”: Black-Box Reduction for Efficient Up-to-Constant Guar-
antees). If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for Bayesian revenue-maximization up
to a constant factor C given an explicitly specified finite product distribution, then for every
22Extending the mechanism µ returned by the optimizer in OptimizationOracle to be defined over all
of [0, H]n·mε as follows, though (following Gonczarowski and Nisan, 2017): for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] s.t.
vi,j /∈ suppWi,j , replace vi,j with max{wi,j ∈ suppWi,j | wi,j ≤ vi,j}.
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ε, δ > 0 and for every η ≤ poly(n,m,L,H, ε), there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that
given poly(n,m,L,H, 1/ε, 1/η, log 1/δ) samples from each Vi,j, with probability at least 1− δ
outputs an IR and η-BIC auction that attains from×i,j Vi,j expected revenue at most an
additive ε smaller than a C fraction of that of any IR and η-BIC mechanism.
7.2 Partial Correlations
In some settings, there could be partial correlations between the distributions of the values
of each bidder for the various goods. Our construction and analysis can also be modified
to analyze such settings, to obtain sample bounds that are polynomial in the independent
dimensions. To give a few examples:
• If there are correlations across values of different goods for the same bidder, but dif-
ferent bidders’ valuations are independent, then our upper bound for |M | becomes
(S+ 1)m·(dH/εe)
n
, and so our analysis would yield sample complexity that is polynomial
in the number of bidders (as our upper bound of |M | in this case is still singly ex-
ponential in the number of bidders) and exponential in the number of goods (as our
upper bound of |M | in this case is doubly exponential in the number of goods).
• If for each bidder i the values of every two goods 2j, 2j+1 ∈ [m] are correlated, but are
independent of the values of these goods for any other bidder, and of the values of any
other good for any bidder, then our upper bound for |M | becomes (S + 1)n·m/2·(dH/εe)2 ,
and so our analysis still yields sample complexity that is polynomial in the both the
number of bidders and the number of goods (as our upper bound of |M | in this case is
still singly exponential in both parameters). This is an example for a weaker form of
correlation for which our analysis can still yield sample complexity that is polynomial
in all parameters.
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A Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility
In this appendix, we demonstrate a somewhat less involved version of our analysis and prove
the following result, which we find interesting in its own right — a version of our main
result for dominant strategy (rather than Bayesian) incentive compatibility. The proofs of
supporting lemmas are relegated to Appendix B. We start by phrasing a weak technical
assumption that this result additionally requires.
Definition (Weakly Downward Closed). We say that the set of allowed allocations X is
weakly downward closed if for every outcome x ∈ X and for every k ∈ [n], there exists x′ ∈ X
such that a) vk(x
′) = vk(x) for every vk = (vk,j)j∈[m], and b) vi(x′) = 0 for every i 6= k and
vi = (vi,j)j∈[m].23
Theorem 11 (Main Result — DSIC Variant). If X is weakly downward closed, then for
every ε, δ > 0, the sample complexity of learning an IR and ε-DSIC auction whose rev-
enue differs from that of the optimal IR and DSIC auction by less than an additive ε is at
most poly(n,m,L,H, 1/ε, log 1/δ). That is, there exists a deterministic algorithm24 that given
poly(n,m,L,H, 1/ε, log 1/δ) samples from each Vi,j, with probability 1−δ outputs an IR and
ε-DSIC auction that attains from×i,j Vi,j expected revenue at most an additive ε smaller
than any IR and DSIC auction.
Proof. We assume that for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], we have S (to be determined later)
independent samples (vsi,j)
S
s=1 from Vi,j. Algorithm 2 presents our learning algorithm, which
is similar in nature to the one presented in Devanur et al. (2016) for certain single-parameter
environments, however the analysis that we will use to show that it does not overfit the
samples is completely different (even for single-parameter environments, where our analysis
holds for arbitrary weakly downward closed allocation constraints — note that this assump-
tion guarantees that the modification to the allocation rule of the mechanism returned by
OptimizationOracleDSIC still results in allocations in X). We now analyze Algorithm 2.
Note that for every i, j, s, we have that wsi,j ∼ bVi,jcε independently.
Let V be the set of all product distributions×i,jW ′i,j where each W ′i,j is the uniform
distribution over some multiset of S values from [0, H]ε. Let M be the set of all mechanisms
of the form OptimizationOracleDSIC(H,X, ε,×i,jW ′i,j) for all×i,jW ′i,j ∈ V . At the heart
of our analysis is the observation that |V| < (S + 1)n·m·dH/εe. (Crucially, this expression
has S only in the base and not in the exponent!) Indeed, for every×i,jW ′i,j ∈ V , for
every i, j, and for every integer multiples of ε in [0, H] (there are dH/εe many such values),
the probability of this value in W ′i,j can be any of the S+1 values 0, 1/S, . . . , 1. (The inequality
on |V| is strict since, for example, not all probabilities can be 0 simultaneously.) Therefore,
|M | < (S + 1)n·m·dH/εe.
23For example, for the multi-item setting this is satisfied if for every x = (xi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] ∈ X and for every
i ∈ [n], we have that (xi, 0−i) ∈ X as well.
24Once again, recall that this result is information-theoretic and not computationally efficient (by necessity,
without resolving major open problems), so our decision maker (seller) is computationally unbounded, and
we allow the algorithm to make calls to any deterministic oracle that has no access to any Vi,j . In particular,
we assume access to an oracle that can solve the revenue maximization problem on any precisely given V ′i,j
of finite support.
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Function EmpiricalOptimizeDSIC(H,X, ε, δ, (vsi,j)
s∈[S]
i∈[n],j∈[m]):
Input: For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], (vsi,j)s=1 is a sequence of
S = O˜
(
n2m2L2H2
ε2
· (log 1/δ + nmHε )) samples from Vi,j
Output: With probability 1−δ, an IR and (4mε)-DSIC mechanism defined over
[0, H]n·m with allocations in X, whose expected revenue from×i,j Vi,j is up to
an additive (2+n)mε smaller than that of any IR and DSIC mechanism
defined over×i,j suppWi,j with allocations in X
for i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] do
for s ∈ [S] do
wsi,j ←− bvsi,jcε
end
Wi,j ←− the uniform distribution over (wsi,j)Ss=1
end
µ←− OptimizationOracleDSIC(H,X, ε, (Wi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m]) // See definition below
return The mechanism that for input (vi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] outputs µ
((bvi,jcε)i∈[n],j∈[m])
Function OptimizationOracleDSIC(H,X, ε, (Wi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m]):
Input: For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], Wi,j is a distribution over [0, H]ε
Output: An IR and (2mε)-DSIC mechanism defined over [0, H]n·mε with allocations in
X, which maximizes the expected revenue from×i,jWi,j among all IR and
(2mε)-DSIC mechanisms defined over×i,j suppWi,j with allocations in X
µ←− an IR and (2mε)-DSIC mechanism defined over×i,j suppWi,j with allocations
in X, which maximizes the expected revenue from×i,jWi,j among all such
mechanisms
return The mechanism obtained by extending µ to be defined over all (vi,j)i,j ∈ [0, H]n·mε
as follows: if vk,j /∈ suppWk,j for precisely one bidder k (and one or more
parameters j), then an outcome is chosen such that bidder k’s valuation and
payment are the same as in µ(v′k, v−k), for v
′
k = (v
′
k,j)j∈[m] ∈ supp×jWk,j that
maximizes E
[
uk
(
vk, µ(v
′
k, v−k)
)]
, and such that all other bidders’ valuations of
the outcome are zero irrespective of their valuations, and all other bidders’
payments are zero. If vi,j /∈ suppWi,j for more than one bidder i, then an
outcome is chosen such that all bidders’ valuations are zero irrespective of their
valuations and all payments are zero.
Algorithm 2: Empirical Multi-Parameter Up-to-ε DSIC Revenue Maximization.
Let OPT be the IR and DSIC auction defined over×i,j suppVi,j that maximizes the
expected revenue (among such auctions) from×i,j Vi,j (our learning algorithm cannot hope
to find OPT, but in our analysis we may carefully reason about it, as it is nonetheless well
defined; in particular, it does not depend on S). Let OPTε be the (randomized) mechanism
defined over×i,jbVi,jcε as follows: let w = (wi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] be an input valuation; for each i, j,
independently draw vi,j ∼ Vi,j|[wi,j ,wi,j+ε); let (x, p) = OPT
(
(vi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m]
)
; the allocation of
OPTε(w) is x, and the payment of each bidder i is pi −mε.
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Lemma A.1. OPTε is an IR and (2mε)-DSIC mechanism whose expected revenue from×i,jbVi,jcε is nmε smaller than the expected revenue of OPT from×i,j Vi,j.
We will choose S so that with probability at least 1−δ, it simultaneously holds for all
mechanisms µ ∈M ∪ {OPTε} that
|Rev×i,jWi,j(µ)− Rev×i,jbVi,jcε(µ)| ≤ mε. (5)
By Theorem 3 (with ` , n ·m, and note that any mechanism’s revenue is bounded by
nmLH), we have that for each mechanism µ ∈M ∪ {OPTε} separately, Equation (5) holds
with probability at least 1− 4nmLHe− exp(−ε2S/(8n2m2L2H2))
ε
. Choosing S so that this probability
is at least 1 − δ|M |+1 , we obtain that Equation (5) holds simultaneously for all mechanisms
µ ∈M ∪{OPTε} with probability at least 1−δ. We now estimate S. Since |M ∪{OPTε}| ≤
(S + 1)n·m·dH/εe, we have that it is enough to take S such that
S ≥ 8n2m2L2H2
ε2
· (log 4nmLH
ε
+ log 1/δ + nmdH/εe log(S + 1)).
Therefore,25 there exists an appropriate
S = O
(
n2m2L2H2
ε2
· log nmLH
εδ
+ n
3m3L2H3
ε3
log
(
n2m2L2H2
ε2
· log nmLH
εδ
+ n
3m3L2H3
ε3
))
=
= O˜
(
n2m2L2H2
ε2
· (log 1/δ + nmH
ε
))
.
Let µ be the output of the call to OptimizationOracleDSIC in Algorithm 2 (note that
it is well defined since X is weakly downward closed), and let µε be the final output of the
algorithm (the output of EmpiricalOptimizeDSIC).
Lemma A.2. µε is an IR and (4mε)-DSIC mechanism whose expected revenue from×i,j Vi,j
identical to the expected revenue of µ from×i,jbVi,jcε.
So, we have that µε is an IR and (4mε)-DSIC mechanism (by Lemma A.2) and that with
probability at least 1−δ:
Rev×i,j Vi,j(µε) = (by Lemma A.2)
= Rev×i,jbVi,jcε(µ) ≥ (by Equation (5) and since µ ∈M)
≥Rev×i,jWi,j(µ)−mε ≥ (since OPTε is IR and (2mε)-DSIC and by optimality of µ)
≥Rev×i,jWi,j(OPTε)−mε ≥ (by Equation (5) for OPTε)
≥Rev×i,jbVi,jcε(OPTε)− 2mε = (by Lemma A.1)
= Rev×i,j Vi,j(OPT)− (2+n)mε.
Two main differences between the statements of Theorem 11 and of Theorem 4 stand
out: the technical requirement that X be weakly downward closed, and the fact that the
learned mechanism has weaker incentive properties than the benchmark. In Section 5 we
have avoided the latter within the context of Bayesian incentive compatibility via Theorem 2.
It would be interesting to understand whether and to what extent a similar result also applies
within the context of dominant-strategy incentive compatibility.
25The requirement is of the form S ≥ a+ b logS, so the tight solution is of order a+ b log(a+ b).
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Open Problem 2. Even in an additive multi-item setting, is the maximum revenue at-
tainable by any IR and ε-DSIC auction from a given product distribution at most poly(ε)
greater than the maximum revenue attainable by any IR and DSIC auction from the same
distribution?
Since the ε-dominant strategy incentive compatibility implies ε-Bayesian incentive com-
patibility, then the question in Open Problem 2 holds whenever the optimal BIC auction
is also DSIC. Recently, Yao (2017) has shown that in general the revenue obtained by the
optimal IR and BIC auctions can be higher than that obtained by the optimal IR and DSIC
auctions — it is such cases in which Open Problem 2 is open and interesting. An affirmative
result for Open Problem 2 would of course immediately imply an analogue of Open Prob-
lem 1 for DSIC auctions, which, if true, would allow Theorem 11 to be strengthened to allow
for learning a precisely DSIC auction.
Open Problem 3. Given an IR and ε-DSIC auction and given some product distribution,
even in an additive multi-item setting, is it possible to transform the given auction into an
IR and (precisely) DSIC auction with negligible (poly(ε) ·poly(n,m,H)) revenue loss from
that distribution using polynomially many samples from this product distribution?
B Omitted Proofs
B.1 Proofs Omitted from Section 5
Proof of Lemma 5.1. Individual Rationality: Let k ∈ [n], let w = (wi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] be a
(rounded) valuation profile, and let v = (vi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] be drawn as defined above. Then:
E
[
uk
(
wk,OPTε(w)
)]
=
= E
[
uk
(
wk,OPT(v)
)
+mε
] ≥ (since valuations are Lipschitz)
= E
uk(vk,OPT(v))−∑
j∈[m]
(vk,j − wk,j) +mε
 ≥ (since vk,j < wk,j + ε)
≥E [uk(vk,OPT(v))] ≥ 0. (since OPT is IR)
Incentive Compatibility: Let k ∈ [n], let wk = (wk,j)j∈[m] and w′k = (w′k,j)j∈[m] be
(rounded) valuations, and let vk = (vk,j)j∈[m] and v′k = (v
′
k,j)j∈[m] be respectively drawn
as defined above. Then:
Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
bVi,jcε
[
uk
(
wk,OPTε(wk, w−k)
)]
=
= Ev−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Vi,j
[
uk
(
wk,OPT(vk, v−k)
)
+mε
] ≥ (since valuations are Lipschitz)
= Ev−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Vi,j
uk(vk,OPT(vk, v−k))−∑
j∈[m]
(vk,j − wk,j) +mε
 ≥ (since vk,j < wk,j + ε)
≥ Ev−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Vi,j
[
uk
(
vk,OPT(vk, v−k)
)] ≥ (since OPT is (3mε)-BIC for×i,j Vi,j)
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≥ Ev−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Vi,j
[
uk
(
vk,OPT(v
′
k, v−k)
)]− 3mε ≥ (since valuations are Lipschitz)
= Ev−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Vi,j
uk(wk,OPT(v′k, v−k))−∑
j∈[m]
(vk,j − wk,j)
− 3mε ≥
(since vk,j < wk,j + ε)
≥ Ev−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Vi,j
[
uk
(
wk,OPT(v
′
k, v−k)
)]− 4mε =
= Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
bVi,jcε
[
uk
(
wk,OPTε(w
′
k, w−k)
)−mε]− 4mε =
≥ Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
bVi,jcε
[
uk
(
wk,OPTε(w
′
k, w−k)
)]− 5mε.
Revenue: Let OPTε = (xε, pε) and let OPT = (x, p). Then:
Rev×i,jbVi,jcε(OPTε) = Ew∼×i,jbVi,jcε [pε(w)] =
= Ev∼×i,j Vi,j
p(v)− ε∑
i∈[n]
mε
 =
≥ Ev∼×i,j Vi,j [p(v)]− nmε =
= Rev×i,j Vi,j(OPT)− nmε.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Incentive Compatibility of OPTε: Let k ∈ [n], let wk = (wk,j)j∈[m] and
w′k = (w
′
k,j)j∈[m] be (rounded) valuations. Then:
Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Wi,j
[
uk
(
wk, µ(wk, w−k)
)] ≥ (by Equation (4) and since µ ∈M)
≥ Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
bVi,jcε
[
uk
(
wk, µ(wk, w−k)
)]−mε ≥ (since µ is (5mε)-BIC for×i,jbVi,jcε)
≥ Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
bVi,jcε
[
uk
(
wk, µ(w
′
k, w−k)
)]− 6mε ≥ (by Equation (4) since µ ∈M)
≥ Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Wi,j
[
uk
(
wk, µ(w
′
k, w−k)
)]− 7mε.
Revenue: by Theorem 2 (for×i,jWi,j), since OPTε is IR and (7mε)-BIC for×i,jWi,j
and by optimality of µ.
Incentive Compatibility of µ: Let k ∈ [n], let wk = (wk,j)j∈[m] and w′k = (w′k,j)j∈[m] be
(rounded) valuations. Then:
Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
bVi,jcε
[
uk
(
wk, µ(wk, w−k)
)] ≥ (by Equation (4) and since µ ∈M)
≥ Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Wi,j
[
uk
(
wk, µ(wk, w−k)
)]−mε ≥ (since µ is BIC for×i,jWi,j)
≥ Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Wi,j
[
uk
(
wk, µ(w
′
k, w−k)
)]−mε ≥ (by Equation (4) since µ ∈M)
≥ Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
bVi,jcε
[
uk
(
wk, µ(w
′
k, w−k)
)]− 2mε.
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Proof of Lemma 5.3. Individual Rationality: let k ∈ [n] and let v = (vi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] be a
valuation profile. Then:
E
[
uk
(
vk, µ
ε(v)
)]
=
= E
[
uk
(
vk, µ
(
(bvi,jcε)i∈[n],j∈[m]
))] ≥
≥ E [uk((bvk,jcε)j∈[m], µ((bvi,jcε)i∈[n],j∈[m]))] ≥ 0. (since µ is IR)
Revenue: Let µε = (xε, pε) and let µ = (x, p). Then:
Rev×i,j Vi,j(µε) = Ev∼×i,j Vi,j [pε(v)] = Ev∼×i,jbVi,jcε [p(w)] = Rev×i,jbVi,jcε(µ).
Incentive Compatibility: Let k ∈ [n], let vk = (vk,j)j∈[m] and v′k = (v′k,j)j∈[m] be valuations,
and denote bvkcε = (bvk,jcε)j∈[m] and bv′kcε = (bv′k,jcε)j∈[m]. Then:
Ev−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Vi,j
[
uk
(
vk, µ
ε(vk, v−k)
)]
=
= Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
bVi,jcε
[
uk
(
vk, µ(bvkcε, w−k)
)] ≥ (since valuations are Lipschitz)
≥ Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
bVi,jcε
uk(bvkcε, µ(bvkcε, w−k))−∑
j∈[m]
(
vk,j − bvk,jcε
) ≥
≥ Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
bVi,jcε
[
uk
(bvkcε, µ(bvkcε, w−k))]−mε ≥
(since µ is (2mε)-BIC for×i,jbVi,jcε)
≥ Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
bVi,jcε
[
uk
(bvkcε, µ(bv′kcε, w−k))]− 3mε ≥ (since valuations are Lipschitz)
≥ Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
bVi,jcε
uk(vk, µ(bv′kcε, w−k))−∑
j∈[m]
(
vk,j − bvk,jcε
)− 3mε ≥
≥ Ew−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
bVi,jcε
[
uk
(
vk, µ(bv′kcε, w−k)
)]− 4mε =
= Ev−k∼× i,j
i 6=k
Vi,j
[
uk
(
vk, µ
ε
(
vk, v−k
)]− 4mε.
B.2 Proofs Omitted from Appendix A
Proof of Lemma A.1. Individual Rationality: Let k ∈ [n], let w = (wi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] be a
(rounded) valuation profile, and let v = (vi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] be drawn as defined above. Then:
E
[
uk
(
wk,OPTε(w)
)]
=
= E
[
uk
(
wk,OPT(v)
)
+mε
] ≥ (since valuations are Lipschitz)
= E
uk(vk,OPT(v))−∑
j∈[m]
(vk,j − wk,j) +mε
 ≥ (since vk,j < wk,j + ε)
≥E [uk(vk,OPT(v))] ≥ 0. (since OPT is IR)
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Incentive Compatibility: Let k ∈ [n], let w = (wi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] be a (rounded) valuation
profile, let w′k = (w
′
k,j)j∈[m] be a (rounded) valuation, and let v = (vi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] and v
′
k =
(v′k,j)j∈[m] be respectively drawn as defined above. Then:
E
[
uk
(
wk,OPTε(wk, w−k)
)]
=
= E
[
uk
(
wk,OPT(vk, v−k)
)
+mε
] ≥ (since valuations are Lipschitz)
= E
uk(vk,OPT(vk, v−k))−∑
j∈[m]
(vk,j − wk,j) +mε
 ≥ (since vk,j < wk,j + ε)
≥ E [uk(vk,OPT(vk, v−k))] ≥ (since OPT is DSIC)
≥ E [uk(vk,OPT(v′k, v−k))] ≥ (since valuations are Lipschitz)
= E
uk(wk,OPT(v′k, v−k))−∑
j∈[m]
(vk,j − wk,j)
 ≥ (since vk,j < wk,j + ε)
≥ E [uk(wk,OPT(v′k, v−k))]−mε =
= E
[
uk
(
wk,OPTε(w
′
k, w−k)
)−mε]−mε =
≥ E [uk(wk,OPTε(w′k, w−k))]− 2mε.
Revenue: Let OPTε = (xε, pε) and let OPT = (x, p). Then:
Rev×i,jbVi,jcε(OPTε) = Ew∼×i,jbVi,jcε [pε(w)] =
= Ev∼×i,j Vi,j
p(v)−∑
i∈[n]
mε
 =
≥ Ev∼×i,j Vi,j [p(v)]− nmε =
= Rev×i,j Vi,j(OPT)− nmε.
Proof of Lemma A.2. Individual Rationality: let k ∈ [n] and let v = (vi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] be a
valuation profile. Then:
E
[
uk
(
vk, µ
ε(v)
)]
=
= E
[
uk
(
vk, µ
(
(bvi,jcε)i∈[n],j∈[m]
))] ≥
≥ E [uk((bvk,jcε)j∈[m], µ((bvi,jcε)i∈[n],j∈[m]))] ≥ 0. (since µ is IR)
Incentive Compatibility: Let k ∈ [n], let v = (vi,j)i∈[n],j∈[m] be a valuation profile, let
v′k = (v
′
k,j)j∈[m] be a valuation, and denote bvkcε = (bvk,jcε)j∈[m], bv′kcε = (bv′k,jcε)j∈[m] and
bv−kcε = (bvi,jcε)i∈[n]\{k},j∈[m]. Then:
E
[
uk
(
vk, µ
ε(vk, v−k)
)]
=
= E
[
uk
(
vk, µ(bvkcε, bv−kcε)
)] ≥ (since valuations are Lipschitz)
≥ E
uk(bvkcε, µ(bvkcε, bv−kcε))−∑
j∈[m]
(
vk,j − bvk,jcε
) ≥
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≥ E [uk(bvkcε, µ(bvkcε, bv−kcε))]−mε ≥ (since µ is (2mε)-DSIC)
≥ E [uk(bvkcε, µ(bv′kcε, bv−kcε))]− 3mε ≥ (since valuations are Lipschitz)
≥ E
uk(vk, µ(bv′kcε, bv−kcε))−∑
j∈[m]
(
vk,j − bvk,jcε
)− 3mε ≥
≥ E [uk(vk, µ(bv′kcε, bv−kcε))]− 4mε =
= E
[
uk
(
vk, µ
ε
(
v′k, v−k
)]− 4mε.
Revenue: Let µε = (xε, pε) and let µ = (x, p). Then:
Rev×i,j Vi,j(µε) = Ev∼×i,j Vi,j [pε(v)] = Ev∼×i,jbVi,jcε [p(w)] = Rev×i,jbVi,jcε(µ).
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